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Abstract
We present secml, an open-source Python library for secure and explainable machine learn-
ing. It implements the most popular attacks against machine learning, including not only
test-time evasion attacks to generate adversarial examples against deep neural networks,
but also training-time poisoning attacks against support vector machines and many other
algorithms. These attacks enable evaluating the security of learning algorithms and of
the corresponding defenses under both white-box and black-box threat models. To this
end, secml provides built-in functions to compute security evaluation curves, showing how
quickly classification performance decreases against increasing adversarial perturbations of
the input data. secml also includes explainability methods to help understand why adver-
sarial attacks succeed against a given model, by visualizing the most influential features
and training prototypes contributing to each decision. It is distributed under the Apache
License 2.0, and hosted at https://gitlab.com/secml/secml.
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1. Introduction
Machine learning has been shown to be vulnerable to well-crafted attacks, including test-
time evasion (i.e., adversarial examples) and training-time poisoning attacks (Huang et al.,
2011; Biggio et al., 2013, 2012; Szegedy et al., 2014; Papernot et al., 2016; Carlini and
Wagner, 2017; Biggio and Roli, 2018). The main idea behind such adversarial attacks,
first explored by Biggio et al. (2012, 2013), has been to formalize them as constrained
optimization problems, and use gradient-based solvers to generate the corresponding attack
samples (see, e.g., Biggio and Roli, 2018; Joseph et al., 2018). This research field has however
boomed only after that Szegedy et al. (2014) independently discovered the same kind of
vulnerability on state-of-the-art deep neural networks (DNNs) for image classification. Since
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Code dependencies:
❏cleverhans for additional support to evasion attacks
❏pytorch for DNN support
❏sklearn for ML algorithms and normalizers
mladv expl
seceval
attacks classifiers
normalizers
optim utilsdata
loggerloaders
array figure
Evasion:
❏FGSM, BIM, MIM, CW
❏PGD, PGD-LS, ...
parallel
❏DNNs (incl. pretrained models)
❏SVMs (incl. kernels)
❏DTs, RFs, Logistic, Ridge, ...
❏Min-max, mean-std, ...
❏DNN-based feature extractors
Poisoning:
❏SVM, Ridge, Logistic
❏numpy and scipy for data and array management
❏matplotlib for visualization
❏joblib for parallel execution
plots
❏ROC, Confusion matrix
❏Security evaluation, ...
❏CIFAR10, MNIST, LFW, ...
❏blobs, moons, circles, ...
Figure 1: Main packages and architecture of secml.
then, adversarial examples have be n demonstrated in many different domains, including also
speech recognition and malware detection. Despite the large amount of papers published
in this research area, properly evaluating the security of learning algorithms and designing
effective defenses against adversarial attacks remain two challenging open issues.
In this work, we present secml, an open-source Python library that aims to help tackle
the aforementioned issues and favor the development of more secure learning algorithms.
To this end, secml implements: (i) a methodology for the empirical security evaluation of
machine-learning algorithms under different evasion and poisoning attack scenarios; and (ii)
explainable methods to help understand why and how adversarial attacks are able to sub-
vert the decisions provided by machine-learning algorithms. With respect to other popular
libraries that implement attacks almost solely against DNNs (Papernot et al., 2018; Rauber
et al., 2017; Nicolae et al., 2018), secml also implements training-time poisoning attacks
and computationally-efficient test-time evasion attacks against many different algorithms,
including support vector machines (SVMs) and random forests (RFs). It also incorporates
both the feature-based and prototype-based explanation methods proposed by Ribeiro et al.
(2016); Sundararajan et al. (2017); Koh and Liang (2017).
2. secml: Architecture and Implementation
secml has a modular architecture oriented to code reuse. We have defined abstract interfaces
for all components, including loss functions, regularizers, optimizers, classifiers and attacks.
By separating the definition of the optimization problem from the algorithm used to solve
it, one can easily define novel attacks or classifiers (in terms of constrained optimization
problems) and then use different optimizers to obtain a solution. This is a great advantage
with respect to other libraries like CleverHans (Papernot et al., 2018) as, e.g., we can switch
from white- to black-box attacks by just changing the optimizer (from a gradient-based to
a gradient-free solver), without re-defining the entire optimization problem.
secml integrates different components via well-designed wrapper classes. We have inte-
grated many attack implementations from CleverHans, and extended them to also compute
the values of the loss function and of the intermediate points optimized during the attack
iterations, as well as the number of function and gradient evaluations. This is useful to
debug and compare different attacks, e.g., by checking their convergence to a local opti-
mum, and properly tune their hyperparameters (e.g., step size and number of iterations).
secml supports DNNs via a dedicated PyTorch wrapper, which can be extended to include
other popular deep-learning frameworks, like TensorFlow and Keras. This allows us to run
attacks that are natively implemented in CleverHans also against PyTorch models.
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Main packages. The library is organized in different packages, as depicted in Fig. 1.
The adv package implements different adversarial attacks and provides the functionalities
to perform security evaluations. It encompasses the evasion attacks provided by Clever-
Hans, as well as our implementations of evasion and poisoning attacks Biggio and Roli
(2018). The ml package imports classifiers from scikit-learn and DNNs from PyTorch. We
have extended scikit-learn classifiers with the gradients required to run evasion and poison-
ing attacks, which have been implemented analytically. Our library also supports chaining
different modules (e.g., scalers and classifiers) and can automatically compute the corre-
sponding end-to-end gradient via the chain rule. The explanation package implements the
feature- and prototype-based explanation methods by Ribeiro et al. (2016); Sundararajan
et al. (2017); Koh and Liang (2017). The optim package provides an implementation of the
projected gradient descent (PGD) algorithm, and a more efficient version of it that runs
a bisect line search along the gradient direction (PGD-LS) to reduce the number of gradi-
ent evaluations (for more details, see Demontis et al., 2019). Finally, data provides data
loaders for popular datasets, integrating those provided by scikit-learn and PyTorch; array
provides a higher-level interface for both dense (numpy) and sparse (scipy) arrays, enabling
the efficient execution of attacks on sparse data representations; figure implements some
advanced plotting functions based on matplotlib (e.g., to visualize and debug attacks); and
utils provides functionalities for logging and parallel code execution.
Testing and documentation. We have run extensive tests on macOS X, Ubuntu 16.04,
Debian 9 and 10, via a dedicated continuous-integration server. We have also successfully
run some preliminary tests on Windows 10. The user documentation is available at https:
//secml.gitlab.io, along with a basic developer guide detailing how to extend the ml
package with other classifiers and deep-learning frameworks. The complete set of unit tests
will be released within the next versions of the library. Many Python notebooks are already
available, including the tutorial presented in the next section.
3. Evasion Attacks on ImageNet
We show here how to use secml to run different evasion attacks against ResNet-18, a DNN
pretrained on ImageNet, available from torchvision. This usage example aims to demonstrate
that secml enables running also CleverHans attacks (implemented in TensorFlow) against
PyTorch models. In particular, we aim to have the race car depicted in Fig. 2 misclassified
as a tiger, using the `2-norm targeted implementations of the Carlini-Wagner (CW) attack
(from CleverHans), and of our PGD attack. We also consider a variant of our PGD attack,
referred to as PGD-patch here, where we restrict the attacker to only change the pixels of
the image corresponding to the license plate, using a box constraint (Melis et al., 2017).
race car tiger (CW) tiger (PGD) tiger (PGD-patch) explanations
Figure 2: Adversarial images (CW, PGD, and PGD-patch) representing a race car misclas-
sified as a tiger. For PGD-patch, we also report explanations via integrated gradients.
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Figure 3: Attack optimization. Left : loss minimization; Right : confidence of source class
(race car, dashed lines) vs confidence of target class (tiger, solid lines), across iterations.
Experimental settings. We run all the attacks for 50 iterations, adjusting the step size
to reach convergence within this range. For CW, we set the confidence parameter κ = 106
to generate high-confidence misclassifications, and c = 0.4, yielding an `2 perturbation size
 = 1.87. We bound PGD to create an adversarial image with the same perturbation size.
For PGD-patch, we do not bound the perturbation size for the pixels that can be modified.
Results. The resulting adversarial images are shown in Fig. 2. For PGD-patch, we also
highlight the most relevant pixels used by the DNN to classify this image as a tiger, using
integrated gradients as the explanation method. The most relevant pixels are found around
the perturbed region containing the license plate, unveiling the presence of a potential ad-
versarial manipulation. Finally, in Fig. 3, we report some plots to better understand the
attack optimization process. The leftmost plot shows how the attack losses (scaled linearly
in [0, 1] to enable comparison) are minimized while the attacks iterate. The rightmost plot
shows how the confidence assigned to class race car (dashed line) decreases in favor of the
confidence assigned to class tiger (solid line) for each attack, across different iterations. We
have found these plots particularly useful to tune the attack hyperparameters (e.g., step size
and number of iterations), and to check their converge to a good local optimum. We firmly
believe that such visualizations will help avoid common pitfalls in the security evaluation of
learning algorithms, facilitating understanding and configuration of the attack algorithms.
4. Conclusions and Future Work
The secml project was born more than five years ago. Even though we only open-sourced
it in August 2019, it has already attracted more than 700 users.1 Thanks to the help of this
emerging community of users and developers, we firmly believe that secml will soon become
a reference tool to evaluate the security of machine-learning algorithms. We are constantly
working to enrich it with new functionalities, by adding novel defenses, wrappers for other
third-party libraries, and more pretrained models to the secml model zoo.
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